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The discussion that follows makes two assumptions. Firstly, 
New Zealand’s population exhibits an increasing diversity 
of  ethnicity, culture, religion, family form, values and so on 
(Boston, Callister and Wolf, 2006).1 Statistics New Zealand 
recorded more than 200 ethnic categories in the 2006 
Census; one in ten usually resident New Zealanders identifies 
with two or more ethnic groups; and young New Zealanders, 
particularly, increasingly exhibit dual, multiple, hybrid (e.g. 
New Zealand-Chinese – or Chinese-New Zealander) and 
mobile ethnic identities.2 Monoculturalism is, therefore, not 
an option for New Zealand. We (whoever the ‘we’ are) cannot 
turn the clock back to a golden age in which we were all much 
the same, or thought we were. Neither is it an option to ‘send 
migrants back to where they came from’.3 Twenty-three per 
cent of  people usually resident in New Zealand in 2006 – 
nearly one in four New Zealanders – were born overseas. In 
the Auckland region, 37% were born overseas (Statistics New 
Zealand, 2009b, p.14).
Secondly, as Winston Churchill put it, ‘Democracy is the 
worst form of  government except all the others that have been 
tried.’ Democratic institutions are imperfect and fragile and 
frustrating, and democratic processes are never ideal, but the 
democratic experiment has run long enough, and in enough 
countries of  the world, to convince me that democracy is our 
best hope of  living together in freedom, justice and peace.
On the basis of  these two assumptions, I will highlight, and 
illustrate, three points of  tension in the theory and practice of  
democracy in an inescapably diverse society:
• individual rights that all share equally versus special group 
rights;
• liberty versus fraternity; and
• democracy as a ‘market’ versus democracy as a ‘forum’.
I will then propose that these tensions be managed 
pragmatically in public life as enduring, even natural, 
tensions, rather than attempting to resolve them by recourse 
to ideologies that make differences a ground for division and 
blur a clear and consistent focus on our common humanity.
Individual rights that all share equally versus special group 
rights
The first point of  tension is whether government should limit 
its role to securing and protecting individual rights that all 
share equally, or whether government should recognise social 
groups, and assign ‘special rights’ (see Hart, 1955, especially 
pp.185-8) to those groups or adopt ‘special measures’ 
(or what is variously called ‘affirmative action’, ‘positive 
discrimination’ or ‘preferential treatment’) (Callister, 2007) to 
Diversity  
and Democracy
David Bromell
Dr David Bromell is a Senior Associate of the Institute of Policy Studies. His 
previous publications on diversity and democracy include Ethnicity, Identity 
and Public Policy: critical perspectives on multiculturalism (Wellington: 
Institute of Policy Studies, 2008) and ‘Recognition, redistribution and 
democratic inclusion’, in E. Rata and R. Openshaw (eds), The Politics 
of Conformity in New Zealand (North Shore City: Pearson, 2009). This 
article develops ideas presented to the Local Government Diversity Forum 
in Wellington on 24 August 2009 and to a community forum (‘Spirited 
Conversations’) in Nelson on 23 September 2009.
A challenge for public policy in New Zealand, as elsewhere, 
is how to keep a diverse society democratic and, conversely, 
how to make democratic practice more inclusive in an 
increasingly diverse society.
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tackle disadvantage that correlates in some way with ethno-
cultural group membership.
Is it ‘one rule of  law for all’? Are public institutions to be 
and remain blind to differences of  race, ancestry, skin colour, 
ethnicity, culture, religion and so on? Are the only rights that 
count universal rights that all share equally by virtue of  our 
common humanity? Or are there rights and privileges that 
attach to some and not others: for example, to Mäori by virtue 
of  claims to indigeneity, or claims based on the Treaty of  
Waitangi? If  so, ought special group rights to be permanent 
or time-limited and limited specifically to reducing social and 
economic inequalities? And do special group rights extend to 
special representation rights: for example, reserved seats on 
local authorities or in Parliament? 
If  we do opt for group-specific rights, what are the trade-
offs between group recognition and rights and the democratic 
principle of  equality? Is there to be a hierarchy of  ethnic 
groups in New Zealand: first, Mäori as tangata whenua; then 
the descendants of  Anglo-Celtic British settlers; and then the 
johnnies-come-lately, all later arrivals? In other words, are 
some New Zealanders, at least in some respects, more equal 
than others?
Liberty versus fraternity
The second point of  tension is similar and related and 
concerns tensions implicit in the French republican motto: 
‘Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité’.4 Is democratic government 
about securing and protecting individual liberty, or is it 
about fraternity – defining, safeguarding and promoting the 
collective interests and well-being of  citizens and communities 
(‘the common good’)? This tension lies at the heart of  
debates between liberal (and particularly libertarian) and 
communitarian political philosophies and various attempts 
to bridge these.5
Are the interests of  all best served when each of  us freely 
pursues our own visions of  the good life, provided we don’t 
significantly limit or harm others’ exercise of  their freedom? 
Is it better for all of  us if  government butts out of  our lives? 
Should we be free to work out for ourselves, in diverse ways, 
matters of  ethnic, cultural and religious identity and practice, 
without either interference or support from the state? Are 
our personal and social group identities matters that properly 
belong in the private realm, in family and kinship groups, 
and in clubs, societies and other voluntary associations?
Or does government have a legitimate role in defining, 
safeguarding and promoting the collective interests of  
citizens and communities, including identifying desired 
community outcomes and social, cultural, economic and 
environmental values and priorities for both current and 
future generations? 
If  the state should limit individual liberty 
in various ways for the sake of  the common 
good, what, in turn, ought to be the limits 
to state paternalism? And how might we 
ensure that ‘the common good’ is not defined 
and captured by a tyranny of  the majority, 
or by noisy, politically active minorities, in 
ways that suppress or mask dissent and difference, let alone 
citizen indifference to local authority Long Term Council 
Community Plans and to voting in local body elections?6
Further, how will we calculate the trade-offs between 
public recognition of  special group rights (particularly 
‘indigenous rights’) and competing claims for equal access to 
‘the commons’, as we’ve seen, for example, in debates about 
race-based and needs-based policies and programmes in 
New Zealand (State Services Commission, 2005; Callister, 
2007), and about the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 (van 
Meijl, 2006)?
Democracy as a ‘market’ versus democracy as a ‘forum’
The third point of  tension is between the practice of  
democracy on the model of  a ‘market’ (aggregative 
democracy), and the practice of  democracy on the model of  
a ‘forum’ (deliberative democracy).7
Is politics essentially a numbers game played out among 
diverse interests, in which people who wish to exercise political 
power trade off  various interests against each other and 
compete to aggregate votes, to ‘do the numbers’, in order to 
gain and retain office? Or is democracy more like a forum, in 
which we participate as citizens in our own self-government 
through discussion, debate, deliberation and persuasion, 
shaping and changing one another’s minds through a 
formative politics until some workable consensus is reached?
If  we think democracy is better served by minimal 
government and maximum protection of  individual liberty, 
we’ll likely prefer the ‘market’ model of  democracy. If, on 
the other hand, we opt for the ‘forum’ model, then we need 
institutions and public spaces where citizens of  all sorts can 
rub shoulders, encounter the reality of  each other’s lives, 
and talk and deliberate together (Sandel, 1996). This has 
implications for the design of  libraries, parks, recreation 
centres, shopping malls, transport systems, broadband 
infrastructure and urban design generally, and for how central 
and local government plan and conduct public consultation 
and citizen engagement.
Both/and, or either/or?
Of  course, I have my own ideas and opinions on each of  these 
three points of  tension. (Some make me tenser than others!) 
My initial academic training, however, was as an historian 
and history amply illustrates that these are perennial tensions 
in the theory and practice of  democracy. They are not 
mutually exclusive either/ors that can, or should, be resolved 
once and for all. More often than not, we have to learn to live 
with a both/and, and settle for solutions that are liveable for 
now, without expecting they will hold for all time.
Are public institutions to be and remain blind 
to differences of race, ancestry, skin colour, 
ethnicity, culture, religion and so on?  
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I will proceed to illustrate this in relation to each of  the 
three points of  tension I have identified.
Individual rights and group recognition and rights
The idea of  liberal democracy emerged following the 
European wars of  religion in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. What eventually resolved this conflict wasn’t 
granting special group rights to particular religious groups, but 
separating church and state and entrenching each individual’s 
freedom of  religion. Within the private sphere, people were 
to be free to associate voluntarily with their co-religionists, 
whoever they might be, without either interference or support 
from the state. The one condition was that when individuals 
exercise their personal liberty within the private sphere, they 
should respect others’ rights. Tolerance and non-coercion 
thus became political virtues.
Thomas Hobbes and those who followed him (Spinoza, 
Locke, Montesquieu, Hume and de  Tocqueville) initiated 
the project of  modern political philosophy and of  liberal 
democracy on this basis. As Mark Lilla (2007, p.92) summarises 
it, the project imagined a new kind of  political order:
It was to be an order where power would be limited, 
divided, and widely shared; where those in power at one 
moment would relinquish it peacefully at another, without 
fear of  retribution; where public law would govern relations 
among citizens and institutions; where many different 
religions would be allowed to flourish, free from state 
interference; where individuals would have inalienable 
rights against government and their fellows.
This is the hard-won tradition of  liberal democracy, a 
precious cultural legacy that European settlers brought to 
these islands. And in fact these European developments were 
reflected in New Zealand during the nineteenth century as 
rival Anglican, Methodist, Catholic and Presbyterian missions 
jostled for position and place (and the ‘saving’ of  Mäori souls) 
in the new colony. At the signing of  the Treaty of  Waitangi in 
1840, Bishop Pompallier expressed concern that establishing 
a British colony might lead to interference in religion. He 
asked for an assurance that ‘free toleration’ would be allowed 
in ‘matters of  faith’, and that a public guarantee be given 
to the Mäori to this effect (Orange, 1992, p.53). A carefully 
written statement was prepared by CMS missionary Henry 
Williams and read to the assembly. William 
Colenso’s version of  this statement, as 
cited by Claudia Orange (ibid.), reads: 
‘The Governor says the several faiths 
of  England, of  the Wesleyans, of  Rome, 
and also the Maori custom, shall be alike 
protected by him.’8
Public recognition of  religion was 
debated again during the first session of  
the House of  Representatives, on Friday 
26 May 1854, immediately following the 
election of  a Speaker. James Macandrew 
moved: ‘That it is fit and proper that 
the first act of  the House of  Representatives shall be a 
public acknowledgement of  the Divine Being, and a public 
supplication for His favour on its future labours’ (New 
Zealand Parliamentary Debates, 26 May 1854, pp.4-6). Other 
members expressed concern that the House ‘be not converted 
into a conventicle’ and that no offence be caused to ‘Jews and 
Unitarians’. Samuel Revans ‘thought the motion would lead 
the House away in a retrograde direction from the free spirit 
of  the Constitution, which appeared to have been framed 
so as that the colonists of  New Zealand at any rate should 
be exempt from the causes of  heartburning on religious 
questions which, being interwoven in the old institutions at 
Home, could not be so readily got rid of.’ 
Frederick Weld’s amendment, ‘That this House, whilst 
fully recognizing the importance of  religious observances, 
will not commit itself  to any act which may tend to subvert 
that perfect religious equality that is recognized by our 
Constitution, and therefore cannot consistently open this 
House with public prayer’, was lost by 20 to 10, however, and 
the original motion put and carried.
A subsequent motion was then put and carried, ‘That, 
in proceeding to carry out the resolution of  the House to 
open its proceedings with prayer, the House distinctly asserts 
the privilege of  a perfect political equality in all religious 
denominations, and that, whoever may be called upon to 
perform this duty for the House, it is not thereby intended 
to confer or admit any pre-eminence to that Church or 
religious body to which he may belong.’ The Reverend F.J. 
Lloyd (Church of  England), being in attendance, was then 
introduced and read prayers (‘Sound: Parliament’s Opening 
Prayer’).
Thirty-three years later, the question was whether public 
education in New Zealand should be secular. Until 1877, 
education was the responsibility of  each province, which 
subsidised schools run by the Anglican, Methodist, Catholic 
and Presbyterian churches. With the abolition of  the provinces 
in 1876, central government took over running schools. 
In large part because of  rivalry between the churches, the 
minister of  Justice, Charles Bowen, introduced a bill into 
the House that was passed as the 1877 Education Act. The 
act withdrew all subsidies from church schools and made 
schooling free, secular and compulsory for all children aged 
between seven and thirteen.
It is curious that a society that was rightly 
cautious about extending public recognition 
and rights to one form of cultural identity 
(namely, religion) has, since the mid-1970s, 
been less critically reflective about extending 
public recognition and rights to another form of 
cultural identity (namely, ethnicity).
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At the first reading, on 24 July 1877, Charles Bowen 
advocated for secular education as ‘the only way to be 
absolutely fair’. This sentiment was mirrored by William 
Gisborne in the second reading debate on 31 August:
I wish to say that I am strongly in favour of  secular education 
by the State. I believe that it is the only education which 
the State can possibly impart to its subjects, not because 
I undervalue religious education, but because practical 
experience has shown that if  a State enforces religious 
education in its school system it will immediately create 
religious animosity and dissension, and it will do more 
harm than good (New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, 
24 July 1877, p.179).
C.A. de Lautour also spoke in favour of  secular 
education:
There is no man yet bold enough to stand up in this House 
and disavow any sympathy with religion; there is no man 
who would say that children are not to be trained up in 
religion; but we do hold that religion can be taught by 
the Church – can be taught at the hearth, and it is not 
necessary that it should be introduced into the daily school 
(ibid., p.197).
This was the classic liberal stance. Matters of  religious 
belief  are for individuals to determine freely for themselves; 
they are matters for home and hearth, and for churches and 
other voluntary associations, not for the state and for state 
institutions.9 
It is curious that a society that was rightly cautious 
about extending public recognition and rights to one form 
of  cultural identity (namely, religion) has, since the mid-
1970s, been less critically reflective about extending public 
recognition and rights to another form of  cultural identity 
(namely, ethnicity).
 In fact, neither in New Zealand nor elsewhere has Hobbes’s 
‘Great Separation’ of  church and state ever been consistently 
achieved. New Zealand has no official religion or established 
church, but state and ceremonial occasions are commonly held 
in Anglican cathedrals or officiated over by Anglican clergy, 
and since the 1975 Private Schools Conditional Integration 
Act the state has substantially funded Catholic and other 
‘special character’ integrated schools, which makes it next 
to impossible to quibble at state funding for Muslim, Jewish, 
Buddhist and other religious schools and otherwise maintain 
a consistent separation between church and state.
But more than a failure of  consistency, this indicates what 
Francis Fukuyama (2006, p.6) has described as ‘a hole in the 
political theory underlying modern liberal 
democracy’. The ‘hole’ concerns whether, 
how and to what extent liberal societies should 
recognise groups as well as individuals.
This is a genuine problem. The human 
self  is torn between freedom and belonging, 
independence and community. We value 
autonomy, self-determination, freedom. But 
the social groups we inhabit aren’t more or less optional extras 
that we freely choose to have, or not to have. Our relationships, 
attachments and identities shape and re-shape the self. We 
don’t just have relationships, attachments and belongings; we 
are our relationships, attachments and belongings (Taylor, 
1989). As Cervantes put it, ‘Tell me what company you keep 
and I’ll tell you what you are.’
So yes, the self  is free, but it remains deeply embedded 
in a society, in a culture, in certain social groups, and in 
certain attachments and identities. And of  course we bring 
these belongings and identities to our political participation, 
because even if  we choose not to, others almost certainly 
will. So there is, and should be, some place in public life 
for recognition of  social groups and their importance in 
our lives (Taylor, 1994). Nevertheless, I will argue that this 
recognition should be largely symbolic rather than tied to 
resources and permanent special group rights. For if  dealing 
with the question of  group recognition and rights in relation 
to religion has proved difficult, the challenge is amplified in 
relation to ethnic identity. Usually, though not always, people 
affiliate with just one religion at a time. But people commonly 
can and do affiliate with two or more ethnic identities, forge 
hybrid identities and change their identities over time and in 
different contexts and for different purposes.
New Zealand has a long history of  inter-ethnic partnering 
and parenting (Callister, Didham and Potter, 2005) and a 
high rate of  intermarriage (Didham, 2004). In a study of  
Mäori intermarriage, Callister (2004) found that around one 
half  of  partnered Mäori had a partner recording other than 
Mäori ethnicity. One in ten usually resident New Zealanders 
identified with two or more ethnic groups in the 2006 
Census.10 Two-thirds of  babies registered as Mäori, one half  
of  babies registered as Pacific peoples and just under a third 
of  babies registered as European or Asian are also registered 
as belonging to some other ethnic group or groups (Statistics 
New Zealand, 2009a).
This makes it impossible to divide New Zealand’s 
population up into stable and mutually exclusive ‘ethnic 
groups’, in order to assign different types of  recognition, 
special group rights or special measures. This is just one 
reason why I have argued elsewhere (2008, pp.35-46, 291-5; 
2009, pp.243-5) that claims to indigeneity and indigenous 
rights in the New Zealand context make little sense now and 
are likely to make even less sense in future. It is becoming 
increasingly difficult to define clear boundaries around who 
is ‘indigenous’ and who is not without resorting to arguments 
that fall back onto discredited race theories about ‘one drop 
of  blood’ being enough.
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There remains an important place, however, for symbolic 
recognition – and this makes possible a both/and balancing 
of  the tension between individual rights that all share equally 
and social group recognition. For example, there is now a 
reasonably secure public consensus that, whatever we think 
about claims to indigeneity, Mäori are and ought to be 
recognised publicly as the ‘first settlers’ of  New Zealand and 
that Mäori consequently have a status as tangata whenua 
(people of  the land), at least in the sense of  being ‘first among 
equals’. This works itself  out in widespread acknowledgement 
of  the Treaty of  Waitangi as a founding document of  the 
nation,11 in recognition of  Mäori as an official language and 
its increasing use in public broadcasting, in the singing of  the 
national anthem in both Mäori and English and in the use of  
elements of  Mäori ceremonial at public occasions and as part 
of  ‘brand New Zealand’. Over time, there may be scope to 
extend this symbolic biculturalism by, for example, changing 
the name of  the country (to Aotearoa?) and adopting a 
new or dual national flag. As Jacob Levy (2000, p.230) has 
commented: ‘Liberalism is right to give rights and resources 
moral priority over recognition and symbols; but that should 
not prevent liberals from seeing the tremendous importance 
symbolic disputes can have to their participants.’
In line with the recommendations in Paul Callister’s (2007) 
discussion (cf. Bromell, 2008, p285, n13), ‘special measures’ 
may also have a place in public policy but ought to be used 
only when the following conditions apply: 
• there is a clear and defensible rationale for them, which 
has broad political and public support; 
• the target can be clearly defined; 
• membership of  the target group is a strong predictor of  
disadvantage, and targeting is accordingly not significantly 
compromised by intra-group diversity and under- or over-
representation; 
• there is strong evidence that the proposed measure 
or measures will efficiently and effectively reduce the 
disadvantage; 
• a goal and/or timeframe is identified and agreed, beyond 
which the special measure or measures will expire; and
• the effectiveness of  the measure or measures once 
implemented is monitored and evaluated. 
In achieving a balance within a liberal democracy 
between protecting individual rights and publicly recognising 
social groups, there does, however, have to be a bottom 
line. Liberal democracy is not value neutral. It requires an 
active commitment to the equal worth and 
dignity of  each human person and equal 
opportunity to lead lives we ourselves have 
reason to value. The fact is, not all cultural 
groups do uphold liberal values about the 
equal worth, dignity and liberty of  people as 
individuals. Both liberalism and democracy 
are seriously compromised by the kind of  
cultural relativism that tolerates anything 
and everything and criticises nothing. 
Liberty and fraternity
So what about balancing individual liberty and the collective 
interests and well-being of  citizens and communities? In fact, 
we do it all the time. In September 2009, Samoa made the 
change from driving on the right to driving on the left. The 
road code is a restriction on individual liberty but we accept 
it as a way of  minimising the risk of  harm that would ensue 
if  everyone drove wherever and however they wished.
Or, to go back in time, consider the debate that raged in 
New Zealand between the 1870s and 1919 about the sale and 
consumption of  alcohol. The prohibition movement very 
nearly carried the day (see Daniels, 1966). In a referendum 
held in April 1919, the initial vote favoured prohibition by 
246,104 to 232,208. But a few days later, the votes of  the 
New Zealand Expeditionary Force and other personnel 
still overseas following World War One were counted. The 
soldiers’ votes were overwhelmingly in favour of  continuance, 
by 31,981 to 7,723, which swung the balance. Continuance 
was narrowly carried with 51% of  the votes. In terms 
of  balancing individual liberty and social well-being, we 
continue to live with this debate, however, in terms of  drink-
driving and the sale and supply of  alcohol to young people.
The 2003 Smoke-free Environments Amendment Act, 
restrictions on the display and sale of  tobacco products and 
the excise tax imposed on tobacco are another example of  
government seeking to balance the freedom of  individuals to 
smoke tobacco if  that’s what they want to do with minimising 
the harm caused to others by passive smoking in public places 
and the cost to our public health system of  disease caused 
by smoking. Social marketing that targets smoking in cars 
and private homes, to reduce the harm caused to children by 
passive smoking, pushes the public-private distinction even 
further. And for many, the Crimes (Substituted Section 59) 
Amendment Act 2007 No 18 overstepped the bounds, and 
resulted in the August 2009 citizens-initiated referendum 
on the question ‘Should a smack as part of  good parental 
correction be a criminal offence in New Zealand?’
My point is that public regulation commonly involves 
arbitrating a practicable balance between securing and 
protecting individual liberty, and defining, safeguarding and 
promoting the collective interests and well-being of  citizens 
and communities. And if  this balancing act is to be and 
remain democratic, then my third point of  tension comes 
to the fore: balancing a ‘market’ model of  democracy with a 
‘forum’ model of  democracy.
Public regulation commonly involves arbitrating 
a practicable balance between securing and 
protecting individual liberty, and defining, 
safeguarding and promoting the collective 
interests and well-being of citizens and 
communities.
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Democracy as a ‘market’ and democracy as a ‘forum’
In the market model, politicians pay attention to well-
defined interests: for example, to senior citizens, to church 
leaders, to iwi, to environmentalists, to the business sector, 
and so on. The job of  government is to provide for these 
diverse interests by arriving at deals and compromises. The 
process parcels up diverse interests into more or less coherent 
packages so politicians can deliver on the promises they have 
made to their supporters, which is what makes the process 
democratic. If  politicians fail to respond to the interests and 
priorities of  those who voted them in, that is a failure in the 
political marketplace and they are likely to be voted out at 
the next election.
The ‘forum’ model, on the other hand, doesn’t assume 
that interests are fixed and known in advance. Rather, it 
assumes that interests can and should be shaped and reshaped 
by processes of  public debate and consensus-building which 
allow collective interests and identities (the common good) to 
emerge and to prevail.
In principle, I am drawn to the model of  democracy as a 
forum in which minds are changed, my own included, and 
we end up, more often than not, with a position that none of  
us anticipated at the outset. But I also recognise how easily 
deliberative democracy can be taken over by minority (and 
quite unrepresentative) voices simply because, for whatever 
reason, they have the motivation and make the time. And 
deliberative democracy does take time, a great deal of  time.12 
It can also drag decision making down to the lowest common 
denominator and entrench the status quo in ways that inhibit 
the exercise of  political leadership in moments of  crisis and 
opportunity.
In fact, no government exclusively follows either the 
‘market’ or the ‘forum’ model of  democracy. Even if, for 
practical reasons, government works more like a market 
than a forum much of  the time, consultation does occur 
more often than not, some of  the most important work of  
Parliament is thrashed out in cross-party select committees, 
the Official Information Act helps to keep the process more or 
less transparent, and the media plays a more or less adequate 
role in informing, stimulating and reflecting public debate.
Ideas, not ideology
There are, I have suggested, three perennial, even natural, 
tensions in the theory and practice of  democracy in diverse 
societies. Each of  these needs to be managed in public life, 
without prematurely resolving them by an either/or choice 
between polarised, ideological positions. 
As Bhikhu Parekh (2008) has argued, our particular 
identities and our universal human identity are dialectically 
related. He urges us to appreciate the plurality and interaction 
of  our social identities; to acknowledge difference and dissent 
and aim at no more than a broad and fluid consensus; to avoid 
oppositional politics and accept that our allegedly opposed 
identities are interdependent and products of  a common 
system of  social relations; and to develop a critical politics 
of  identity, rather than naturalise or accept uncritically an 
historically inherited view of  a collective identity (a politics 
of  culture).
To carry such a project forward in the New Zealand 
context will be difficult, but not as difficult as in some other 
national contexts and certainly not impossible, given our small 
population, our ‘two degrees of  separation’ and something 
of  a national preference for pragmatic ‘muddling through’. 
Above all, it requires the kind of  policy making and statecraft 
that are wise and not just clever, that both acknowledge the 
manifold ways in which we are different from one another 
and keep a clear and consistent focus, not on all that could 
divide us, but on all we have in common.
1 I focus in what follows on ethno-cultural (including religious) diversity, because since the end 
of the Cold War this has become the most common source of political violence in the world 
(Kymlicka, 1995, p.1).
2 For a summary of New Zealand’s demography based on data from the 2006 Census of 
Population and Dwellings, see Bromell (2008), pp.27-35. See further Callister, Didham and 
Potter (2005); Carter et al. (2009); Howard and Didham (nd); Kukutai (2008); Kukutai and 
Callister (2009) and Statistics New Zealand (2007a).
3 See, for example, Ralston (2008) on comments by New Zealand First deputy leader Peter 
Brown in April 2008. John Campbell’s TV3 interview with Peter Brown on 2 April 2008 can 
be accessed at http://www.3news.co.nz/NZ-First-MP-grilled-over-anti-Asian-immigration-
stance/tabid/817/articleID/51227/cat/221/Default.aspx.
4 On managing the tensions between liberty, equality and fraternity in public policy, see 
Moroney (1981).
5 The tension between liberalism and communitarianism further corresponds to a choice 
between deontological and teleological ethics (the ‘right’ and the ‘good’). See, for example, 
Sandel (1982), Gamwell (1984) and Kymlicka (1989).
6 Restructuring of local government in 1989 and the introduction of postal voting was initially 
accompanied by an increase in voter turnout at local authority elections, peaking at 61% 
in 1992. Since then voter turnout has declined steadily, however, with the exception of the 
1998 elections. It dropped below 50% in 2004 for the first time since 1989. Turnout in 
the 2007 elections was 44%. By comparison, voter turnout at the 2008 general election 
was 80%. Source: Department of Internal Affairs (2008), and Party Results and Turnout by 
Electorate.
7 I owe the metaphors of democracy as a ‘market’ or ‘forum’ to Politt (2003), pp.84-5.
8 Hugh Carleton’s version, in his Life of Henry Williams (as cited by Palmer, 2008, p.392, 
n113), reads: ‘The Governor wishes you to understand that all the Maories [sic] who shall 
join the Church of England, who shall join the Wesleyans, who shall join the Pikopo or 
Church of Rome, and those who retain their Maori practices, shall have the protection of the 
British Government.’
9 The Catholics, however, were not happy. Bishop Patrick Moran of Dunedin wrote, in an 
editorial in the New Zealand Tablet on 31 August 1883 which was reproduced as a standing 
editorial until 25 June 1897 under the heading ‘Progress and Justice in the Nineteenth 
Century’: ‘The Catholics of New Zealand provide, at their own sole expense, an excellent 
education for their own children. Yet such is the sense of justice and policy in the New 
Zealand Legislature that it compels these Catholics, after having manfully provided for their 
own children, to contribute largely towards the free and godless education of other people’s 
children!!! This is tyranny, oppression, and plunder’ (New Zealand Tablet, 31 August 1883, 
p.15).
10 i.e., at level one of the ethnic classifications used by Statistics New Zealand. See further 
Statistics New Zealand, 2005, 2007b.
11 I include acknowledgement of the Treaty of Waitangi as ‘symbolic biculturalism’ because, as 
Andrew Sharp (2002, p.11) has observed, references to it as the ‘founding document’ of 
the constitution are more a matter of rhetoric than of legal reality.
12 In advocating for participatory democracy, Iris Marion Young (in Fung, 2004, pp.47-8) 
acknowledges the time and energy this demands of citizens but proposes that this be 
compensated for by a shorter working day and the creation of democratic forums in 
workplaces, with paid childcare to enable parents to attend meetings.
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